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Interpretive Charity and Content Externalism 
 
Interpretive charity is an important principle in devising the content of propositional attitudes 
and their expression. I want to argue that it does not square well with externalism about 
content. Although my argument clearly also applies to a principle of maximizing truth (as it 
requires only the true belief - component of knowledge), I will focus my attention to Timothy 
Williamson’s more intriguing recent proposal of maximizing knowledge: 
 
“The proposal is to replace true belief by knowledge in a principle of charity constitutive of 
content.”1 
 
Williamson’s idea can be put thus: The system of sentences by virtue of which a speaker is 
disposed to state her propositional attitudes is to be assigned referents such as to let the 
maximum number of these attitudes amount to knowledge.  
I want to raise the following objection: It is questionable whether Williamson’s proposal 
squares with externalism about content which he accepts.2 Since the content of an individual’s 
thought is socially determined by the concepts used in a community of speakers, it would be a 
coincidence if this content were to maximize the individual’s knowledge.  
The following example is inspired by George Bealer noting that his Webster’s provides him 
with two understandings of `polygon´: A polygon might be a) a closed, straight-sided plane 
figure or b) a closed, straight-sided plane figure with five or more sides.3 Assume a 
community only endorses understanding (a). Mathematician Alfred is fully initiated in the 
respective social practice and uses `polygon´ in sense (a). He is a paragon of knowing things 
about polygons, for instance that triangles are polygons. Assume that the practice of using 
`polygon´ in his community slowly changes towards sense (b) without him noticing it. At 
some point, only sense (b) remains. But Alfred retains his beliefs as manifested in dispositions 
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to say things like `triangles are polygons´. When sufficient time has passed, according to 
externalist lore it is our practice to ascribe to him beliefs not about polygons in sense (a) but 
in sense (b). Hence certain knowledge attributions cannot be any longer upheld. Taking him 
by his words, one cannot any longer ascribe knowledge to him that triangles are polygons in 
sense (a). Rather one must ascribe to him a false belief that triangles are polygons in sense 
(b).4 But apparently nothing excludes imagining Alfred’s belief system to have the following 
peculiarity: If his words were taken to retain their original meaning (a), he would have more 
knowledge than according to externalist ascriptive practice, for instance knowledge that 
triangles are polygons.5 If so, knowledge maximization recommends interpreting his beliefs in 
sense (a).  
If externalism about content is to be reconcilable with knowledge maximization, there must 
be some mechanism by which the latter keeps track of changes in social linguistic practice. 
Once the advocate of knowledge maximization accepts externalism, the burden of devising 
such a mechanism is on him. Moreover, being prone to taking Alfred’s beliefs literally, we do 
not seem to care whether there be a mechanism by which literalness tracks knowledge 
maximization.6 How can the advocate of knowledge maximization account for this practice? 
Note that the point does not depend on but is merely rendered more salient by the example of 
a change in linguistic practice. It could also be illustrated by everyday cases of incomplete 
understanding, failing to conform to communal practice for other reasons.7 
Consider several objections to my example:  
(i) Objection: A general strategy against my example is to insist that knowledge claims are 
undermined by their dependence on factors which change with communal linguistic practice, 
say according to the principle `no false lemma´. Alfred’s beliefs could depend on 
metalinguistic beliefs which are rendered false by linguistic developments:8 “`Polygon´ in our 
language also applies to planes with less than four sides.” 
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Reply: Tyler Burge notes that people started with object-level beliefs and only later began to 
form metalinguistic ones: 
 
“In fact, there seems to be a general presumption that a person is reasoning at the object level, 
other things being equal. The basis for this presumption is that metalinguistic reasoning 
requires a certain self-consciousness about one’s words and social institutions. This sort of 
sophistication emerged rather late in human history (Cf. any history of linguistics).”9 
 
Surely someone mastering complex words like `polygon´ will be in a position to form explicit 
metalinguistic beliefs.10 Nevertheless, if Burge is right, object-level beliefs can be sufficiently 
independent of metalinguistic beliefs about the words by which they are expressed to exclude 
that, in order to be knowledge, beliefs about polygons must depend on metalinguistic ones, 
e.g. about the role of `polygon´ in a language. 
(ii) Objection: If we retain interpretation (a), Alfred normally will have plenty of false beliefs 
about the world, for instance he might be prone to state: `According to my fellows’ linguistic 
practice, triangles are polygons.´ Hence there will be a trade-off between knowledge he gains 
and knowledge he loses according to the respective interpretation.  
Reply: This does not mean that there cannot be situations in which the false beliefs are 
outweighed by the gain in knowledge an interpretation diverging from the externalist lay of 
the land delivers. At least Williamson does not give reasons to suppose otherwise. 
(iii) Objection: We might expect that knowledge should be stable if information is augmented. 
Now there is plenty of relevant information which would amount to revising Alfred’s claims 
to knowledge if it were revealed to him. Alfred’s alleged knowledge of polygons is not stable. 
If he were to have all relevant information, he would be prone to say: `Alas, triangles are not 
polygons.´  
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Reply: Here we must carefully consider where the problem comes from. Any countervening 
evidence Alfred may be confronted with is due to communal linguistic practice and not due to 
independent mathematical facts. Triangles still are closed, straight-sided plane figures. If 
Alfred were only to maximize knowledge and did not aim at conforming to communal 
linguistic practice as well, he might not retract his knowledge claim. Alfred’s reaction shows 
and our attributional practice demands that Alfred defers to his linguistic community in the 
ways he represents his knowledge. If knowledge maximization were at stake, his attitude of 
deferring to his community would seem questionable. For he could never be sure whether he 
sufficiently conformed to communal practice to attain an optimum of knowledge given his 
epistemic situation. Perhaps he would fare better in terms of knowledge by using his words 
with an idiosyncratic meaning. 
(iv) Objection: A way for Williamson to cope with the case of Alfred might be to change from 
maximizing an individual’s to maximizing knowledge in a community.  
Reply: The problem is that knowledge in a community must supervene on what the members 
of this community know. No reason has been given why maximizing the individuals’ 
knowledge by reinterpreting some of their concepts so as to diverge from communal 
assessment in the way just outlined should not contribute to maximizing knowledge in a 
community. 
To sum it up, if content is to supervene on communal practice, there seems to be no reason 
why it should at the same time maximize knowledge. Of course, provided our ascriptive 
practice rests on a principle of charity, the latter may require to ceteris paribus grant the 
individual as much knowledge as possible. But according to externalist lore, literalness is 
relevant, too. Ceteris paribus, one should take a speaker by her public words, even if this 
means, within limits, ascribing to her less knowledge and more false beliefs than a more fine-
grained, idiosyncratic carving of content would yield.11 
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There does not seem to be a problem to imagine the adult, let him be Alfred, having a belief 
system and suitable evidence which would amount to maximum knowledge if he were 
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1998, p. 48). For now he may have knowledge that chofas comprise single-seat overstuffed 
armchairs. Such knowledge might rest on evidence as perceiving seats and sofas which are 
stuffed in the same way, sofas and seats being sold together and so on. 
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